For more than a year, India’s relationship with the United States has been defined less by shared values than by tariff threats, walked-back claims and last-minute deals. Below is how the key players themselves have described the standoff — and what it reveals about why Washington, for now, carries more weight in New Delhi’s calculations than Moscow or Beijing.
Donald Trump: tariffs as leverage
The US president has been blunt that trade penalties are meant to force a change in India’s oil-buying habits. In August 2025, he ordered an additional 25 per cent tariff on Indian goods, on top of an existing 25 percent duty, taking the combined rate to 50 per cent, then among the highest the US applied to any country. He accused New Delhi of financing Moscow’s war effort through crude purchases and warned that tariffs would stay high until that changed.
Months later, in February 2026, he announced a reduction to 18 per cent, crediting what he called Modi’s agreement to shift away from Russian oil toward American and Venezuelan supply, and describing the Indian leader as a close friend. As recently as January, he suggested tariffs could rise again if India did not fall in line, saying on Air Force One that it mattered to him that New Delhi “help” on the issue.
Narendra Modi: public defiance, quiet accommodation
Modi’s own public posture has been more resistant than Trump’s account suggests. During India’s Independence Day address last August, he vowed to shield the country’s interests “like a wall” against outside pressure.
Yet when Trump announced the tariff rollback in February, Modi welcomed the lower rate on social media without confirming the specific commitment on Russian oil that Trump had claimed — a gap between the two leaders’ versions of events that has recurred through the dispute.
S. Jaishankar: strategic autonomy, on the record
India’s external affairs minister has repeatedly framed the country’s energy policy as diversification rather than realignment, telling audiences that India has “red lines” it will not cross in trade talks with Washington.
He has also travelled to Moscow to co-chair intergovernmental trade talks and meet Russian counterparts, and has spoken of plans to grow India-Russia trade toward 100 billion dollars by 2030 — a target set even as the tariff dispute with the US was near its peak.
Randhir Jaiswal: disputing Washington’s version
India’s Ministry of External Affairs has directly contradicted some of Trump’s claims. Spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal stated flatly that a phone call Trump said took place between the two leaders in October, in which Modi supposedly promised to halt Russian oil purchases, never happened — one of several instances where New Delhi has pushed back publicly against the US framing of what was agreed.
Piyush Goyal: conditions before commitment
India’s commerce minister has said a trade deal with Washington will only be signed once it adequately protects farmers, fishermen and small businesses, signalling that economic concessions are not unconditional even as tariff pressure has mounted.
Analysts: why the asymmetry exists
Sarang Shidore of the Quincy Institute has said he expects India to maintain a substantial energy relationship with Russia regardless of US pressure. Pankaj Srivastava of Rystad Energy has noted that India kept importing Russian crude through multiple rounds of US tariffs rather than cutting off purchases outright.
Their assessments point to the same underlying fact: unlike Russia, which can only offer India cheaper oil, the US can restrict access to its own market — India’s largest export destination — giving Washington a form of pressure Moscow simply cannot match.
Roman Babushkin: Moscow’s counter-pitch
Russia has not stood by passively. Its charge d’affaires in New Delhi, Roman Babushkin, used a briefing last August to describe India as a major global and economic power with an independent foreign policy, pointing to regular calls between Putin and Modi and looking ahead to Putin’s visit to India — a trip that materialised in December 2025 and produced a new military cooperation pact allowing Indian and Russian forces to deploy reciprocally.
Beijing’s overture
Chinese officials have separately pushed to revive the long-dormant Russia-India-China format, arguing publicly that the three countries should see each other as opportunities rather than threats and that stable relations among them serve global stability.
India has responded cautiously — border tensions with China remain unresolved even as diplomatic contact continues — which is itself telling: New Delhi is willing to explore closer ties with Beijing only at arm’s length, while its engagement with Washington, however contentious, has stayed active and high-level throughout the tariff fight.
The picture that emerges
No single account here shows India simply following American instructions. Modi’s government has disputed Washington’s claims, kept Russian oil flowing for months after each tariff hike, deepened military ties with Moscow, and left the door open to Beijing.
But taken together, these individual positions show why the US relationship absorbs more of New Delhi’s attention than the other two: it is the one relationship where the other side can inflict direct economic damage on short notice, and where the government has had to respond — through denials, partial concessions, or renewed talks — every time Washington has moved.
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